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 2 
Abstract 11 
 12 
Humans can reflect on previous decisions and report variable levels of confidence. But why 13 
maintain an explicit representation of confidence for choices that have already been made and 14 
therefore cannot be undone? Here we show that an explicit representation of confidence is 15 
harnessed for subsequent changes of mind. Specifically, when confidence is low, participants are 16 
more likely to change their minds when the same choice is presented again, an effect that is most 17 
pronounced in participants with greater fidelity in their confidence reports. Furthermore, we show 18 
that choices reported with high confidence follow a more consistent pattern (fewer transitivity 19 
violations). Finally, by tracking participants’ eye movements we demonstrate that lower-level gaze 20 
dynamics can track uncertainty but do not directly impact changes of mind. Taken together, these 21 
results suggest that an explicit and accurate representation of confidence has a positive impact on 22 
the quality of future value-based decisions. 23 
 24 
Introduction  25 
 26 
As we navigate through life we are constantly faced with choices that require us to assign and 27 
compare the values of different options or actions. Some of these value-based choices seem 28 
relatively straightforward (‘What should I eat for lunch?’) and others less so (‘Which job offer should 29 
I take?’). No matter how simple or complex these choices are, they are often accompanied by a 30 
sense of confidence in having made the right choice. Recent work has shown that it is possible to  31 
behaviourally and computationally dissociate a value estimate (‘How much do I like something?’) 32 
from internal fluctuations in confidence (‘How sure am I?’). For example, at a behavioural level it 33 
has been shown that confidence shares only a limited amount of variance with value, and instead 34 
reflects an assessment of choice accuracy1.  This relation between value and confidence is neatly 35 
accounted for computationally by assuming that confidence emerges from the dynamics of noisy 36 
accumulators in an evidence-accumulation framework 1, 2, 3, 4. More recently, Lebreton and 37 
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colleagues have shown that confidence may be an inherent property of value estimation, sharing a 38 
quadratic relationship with a linear rating of value5 (see also the work of Barron and colleagues6). 39 
But what is the function of confidence? Why maintain an explicit representation of confidence when 40 
a choice has already been made and therefore cannot be undone? 41 
 42 
According to one view, confidence can be thought of as a by-product of a stochastic accumulation 43 
process implemented in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) during value comparison. 44 
Previous work indicates the brain constructs an explicit representation of confidence that underpins 45 
verbal reports 7, 8. A range of studies suggests that the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex represents 46 
confidence in both value-based and perceptual decisions 1, 9, 10, 11. Explicit representations of 47 
confidence allow individuals to communicate the strength of their beliefs to others, facilitating group 48 
decisions 12, 13, but may play little role in one’s own decision process. 49 
 50 
An alternative view is that explicit representations of confidence are critical for guiding one’s own 51 
future behaviour 14. Work in perceptual decision-making has revealed commonalities between 52 
mechanisms supporting confidence construction and error-monitoring 15, 16, suggesting changes of 53 
mind may be informed by confidence 4. However, it is unknown whether confidence is harnessed 54 
over a longer timescale to guide future choices. Here we aim to test the hypothesis that an explicit 55 
(and well-tuned) representation of confidence in a recent choice can guide a decisions maker’s 56 
choice when faced by the same (or a similar) decision again. To test this hypothesis, we presented 57 
participants with the same set of choices more than once during the course of two experiments and 58 
tested which factors were associated with a change of mind. We then investigated how confidence 59 
related to the degree of internal consistency in their patterns of choice. Choice consistency can be 60 
quantified by measuring the degree of transitivity across choices. Here we introduced a novel 61 
method for tagging choices as conforming to or violating transitivity. Using this method we were 62 
able to show that explicit representations of confidence are associated with more consistent 63 
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patterns of choice as a consequence of changes of mind. Finally, we directly contrasted the effect 64 
of explicit confidence reports with lower-level markers of uncertainty that we gathered using eye 65 
tracking, revealing that changes of mind were specifically associated with explicit reports of 66 
confidence. 67 
 68 
Results 69 
We collected data in two experiments in which hungry participants made choices between food 70 
items (which they could consume later) while their eye movements were monitored. In the first 71 
experiment the twenty-eight participants included in the study were shown high-definition pictures 72 
of two snacks and were asked to choose the preferred one (Figure 1 A). In a second experiment 73 
twenty-four participants chose their preferred snack among three snacks available in each trial 74 
(Figure 1 D).  After making each choice, participants reported their degree of confidence in having 75 
made the ‘correct’ choice, which in this design equates to choosing the higher valued item. The 76 
value for individual items was elicited using a standard incentive compatible BDM-method17. The 77 
experimental procedure we used was adapted (with modifications) from a task we developed 78 
previously1 (see methods for more details). 79 
 80 
Relation between confidence and choice 81 
In line with a wealth of previous research 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 we found that the difference in value between 82 
the two items (constructed from values elicited through an incentive-compatible bidding procedure, 83 
BDM) was a reliable predictor of participants’ choices in both experiments (hierarchical logistic 84 
regression; Experiment 1: z =11.48, p< .0001, Figure 1C and F; Experiment 2: z=6.66, p<.0001, 85 
Figure 1B and E). Note that in the three-choice design (Experiment 2) DV was calculated as the 86 
difference between the value of the reference item and the average of the two other available 87 
options (following Krajbich and Rangel23). In the supplemental materials (S1) we additionally report 88 
the result of a multinomial logistic regression model in which the value of each option was inputted 89 
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independently and therefore does not require a priori specification of DV. This analysis yielded the 90 
same pattern of results. In both studies we also identified a significant negative interaction between 91 
the summed value of all options (SV) and value difference (DV) (Experiment 1: z=-3.08, p<.005; 92 
Experiment 2: z=-2.84, p<.005), indicating that DV had a stronger influence on choice when item 93 
values were low, compared to when items were high in value (Figure 1 C and F). To our 94 
knowledge this effect has not been reported before but is consistent with the Weber–Fechner law 95 
in sensory perception in which the resolution of precepts diminishes for stimuli of greater 96 
magnitude. The effect is also compatible with the notion of normalization 24, 25, 26. Confidence, 97 
unlike DV, was not in itself a predictor of choice (right or left item) but instead correlated with 98 
choice accuracy, with a steeper slope relating DV to choice when confidence was high, as found 99 
previously1 (Fig. 1B, E; Experiment 1:  z=7.43, p<.0001; Experiment 2: z=5.82, p<.0001).  100 
 101 
Using eye tracking we measured the dynamics of eye movements between items during the 102 
choice, both the total amount of time participants spent looking at each item and how frequently 103 
gaze shifted back and forth between items (see supplementary materials, section S2).  Replicating 104 
previous studies23, 27 we found that the difference in dwell time (DDT) was a robust predictor of 105 
choice in both two-option and three-option experiments (Experiment 1: z=4.95, 106 
p<.0001;Experiment 2: z=9.81, p<.0001; Figure 1 C and F). 107 
 108 
For a full list of fitted models and their respective BIC scores see the supplementary materials 109 
(section S3). 110 
Figure 1 111 
Factors that contribute to confidence 112 
 113 
We next investigated which variables contributed to subjective confidence during value-based 114 
choice. Our previous work shows an interrelationship between absolute difference in value (|DV|), 115 
 6 
response time (RT) and confidence (i.e. participants are more confident when |DV| is high and their 116 
choice are faster)1. These findings are in line with the conceptual relation between confidence, 117 
strength of evidence (indexed by |DV| in the value-based framework) and decision time3, 28. We 118 
observed this same relation in the current study. In both experiments we found that |DV| was a 119 
significant predictor of confidence (Experiment 1: t=13.43 p<.0001; Experiment 2: t=7.46, p<.0001). 120 
We also found that RT was a negative predictor of confidence (Experiment 1: t=-10.01, p<.0001; 121 
Experiment 2: t=-7.53, p<.0001). Additionally, we found that summed value positively predicted 122 
confidence, meaning that participants tended to be more confident when the options were all high 123 
in value (Experiment 1: t=3.50, p<.005; Experiment 2: t=4.80, p<.0001). This finding indicates that 124 
overall value might boost confidence, despite paradoxically making choices less accurate. More 125 
broadly these findings highlight how evidence and confidence, though related, play partially 126 
independent roles in the decision making process. Note that all of the predictors analysed in this 127 
section were entered into the same hierarchical linear regression; therefore all the effects hold 128 
when controlling for the other variables reported. 129 
 130 
We also hypothesized that lower-level features of information sampling may reflect an individual’s 131 
explicit confidence reports. To test this idea, we constructed a novel measure that captured 132 
uncertainty in information-sampling behaviour. This new measure, which we label “gaze shift 133 
frequency” (GSF), indexes how frequently gaze shifted back and forth among the options 134 
presented on the screen. This measure is independent of difference in dwell-time (Experiment 1 135 
r=-.02, Experiment 2 r=.04): for a constant allocation of time between the options (e.g. 3 seconds 136 
for the left-hand option and 5 seconds for the right-hand option) one may shift fixation only once 137 
(switching from left to right after 3 seconds have elapsed, for example; low gaze shift frequency) or 138 
shift many times between the two options (high gaze shift frequency). We found that GSF was a 139 
robust negative predictor of confidence in both experiments (Experiment 1: t=-3.67, p<.005; 140 
Experiment 2: t=-8.94, p<.0001) see Figures 2 A and B. In other words, in trials in which 141 
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participants shifted their gaze more often between the available options their confidence was 142 
lower, even after accounting for changes in |DV| and RT. The four-way relationship between |DV|, 143 
RT, GSF and confidence is plotted in Figures 2 C and D. Correlation tables can be found in the 144 
supplementary materials (S4).  145 
 146 
Figure 2 147 
 148 
Confidence predicts change of mind 149 
In both experiments participants saw the same exact choice sets on more than one occasion. In 150 
Experiment 1 each pair was presented twice; in Experiment 2 each triad was presented three times 151 
(counterbalancing for different spatial locations). This design allowed us to determine factors 152 
affecting changes of mind when the same choice is encountered again. Note that the way we 153 
define change of mind in this study is different from how it is often defined in perceptual decision-154 
making, as a reversal in an ongoing motor plan due to additional processing of sensory 155 
information4, 15, 29, 30. The hypothesis we sought to test was that an explicit report of confidence in 156 
an initial choice at time t would influence behaviour when the same decision was presented again 157 
at a future time tfuture. In a hierarchical logistic regression, lower confidence at time t was indeed 158 
associated with increased changes of mind at time tfuture in both experiments (Experiment 1:  z=-159 
6.70, p<.0001; Experiment 2: z=-5.71, p<.0001). The effect of confidence in predicting change of 160 
mind remained robust after controlling for several other factors that might correlate with the stability 161 
of a choice such as |DV| and RT. Because |DV| correlated positively with confidence (see the 162 
previous section and S4) we checked the covariance matrices and Variance Inflation Factors 163 
(VIFs) to ensure that these correlations did not influence the interpretation of our findings. Both the 164 
covariances and the VIFs were below standard thresholds, allowing straightforward interpretation 165 
of coefficients (see S5). Furthermore, to rule out the possibility that the effect we observed was 166 
driven by the presence of fast errors that were later corrected by the participant, we reanalysed the 167 
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data excluding all trials that were faster than each participant’s mean response time. This analysis 168 
produced comparable results (See S6). Notably GSF, itself a correlate of confidence, did not 169 
predict change of mind when included in the regression analysis (Fig. 3 A and B, coefficients in 170 
blue), even when excluding reported confidence from the regression analysis (see supplementary 171 
materials, section S7a). Together, these results suggest that a low-level (and possibly implicit) 172 
representation of uncertainty indexed by GSF is insufficient to trigger a future change of mind. On 173 
the contrary, individuals may use an explicit representation of uncertainty (expressed through 174 
confidence) to reverse their initial decision when the same (or a similar) choice is presented again.   175 
 176 
We next harnessed individual differences in metacognition to provide a more stringent test of this 177 
hypothesis. We reasoned that the impact of confidence on changes of mind would be more 178 
prominent in participants who have enhanced metacognitive skills, i.e. those whose explicit 179 
confidence ratings more accurately track the level of uncertainty underlying their decision process. 180 
In order to test this hypothesis we calculated an individual index of metacognitive sensitivity by 181 
computing the difference in slope between psychometric functions fitted to high and low confidence 182 
trials1, 31, 32. We then ran a logistic regression to predict changes of mind at time tfuture using 183 
confidence measured at time t. In line with our initial hypothesis, we were able to show that the 184 
impact of confidence on changes of mind (here the negative coefficient of confidence predicting 185 
change of mind) is stronger in those subjects with greater metacognitive accuracy (r= -0.35, 186 
p=0.01) (Figure 3 C). 187 
Figure 3 188 
Link between confidence and choice transitivity  189 
In the analyses presented above we established a link between an explicit representation of 190 
confidence and future changes of mind. However, these analyses are agnostic to the quality of the 191 
decisions that emerge as a consequence of changes of mind. Not all choices are born equal; some 192 
are more consistent than others, which is formally captured by the notion of transitivity. A transitive 193 
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ranking is characterized by the following structure: if an option A is preferred over option B and 194 
option B is preferred over option C, then it follows that A should be preferred over C (i.e. A≻B and 195 
B≻C then A≻C).  Transitivity is a normative prescription in utility theory33; however, failures of 196 
transitivity are commonly observed in human choices and represent a prominent violation of 197 
economic rationality and, more generally, of logical consistency34, 35. In order to test the relation 198 
between confidence and transitivity we found the (idiosyncratic) preference ranking of items that 199 
led to the lowest number of transitivity violations for each subject. Finding an optimal ranking of 200 
choice sets with more than a handful of items is extremely complex; however, a number of efficient 201 
algorithms that approximate a numerical solution have been developed for pairwise comparisons. 202 
In our study we used the Minimum Violations Ranking (MVR) algorithm36 that minimizes the 203 
number of inconsistencies in the ranking of items conditional on each participant’s choices. This 204 
method is conceptually similar to other methods based on revealed preferences such as Afriat’s 205 
efficiency index37, 38. The MVR algorithm provides an optimal ranking of items for each participant 206 
so that we could tag choices violating this ranking, hereafter labelled transitivity violations (TV). 207 
Because most of these methods are not suited for ternary choice the analyses presented in this 208 
section were performed only on data collected for the experiment using binary choice (Experiment 209 
1). An alternative way to assess choice quality is to compute the choice ranking using BDM and 210 
test whether participants chose the item with the highest ranking. This method gives qualitatively 211 
similar results to those reported below (see S8). 212 
 213 
After ordering the participants’ choices according to the MVR algorithm, 4.5% of all decisions were 214 
classified as transitivity violations. We then split the dataset into trials in which participants reported 215 
high confidence and trials in which they reported low confidence (median split). A dramatic 216 
reduction in transitivity violations was observed in high confidence trials (16% of transitivity 217 
violations) in comparison to low confidence trials (84% of transitivity violations).  (Figure 4 A) While 218 
these results are consistent with previous evidence provided in this paper and elsewhere1, note 219 
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that we did not rely on BDM value estimates (collected post-choice), instead relying only on 220 
subjects’ choices to generate the optimal ranking. In other words, the link between confidence and 221 
the quality of a value-based decision is robust to the method used to elicit preference.  In order to 222 
statistically quantify the relation between confidence and transitivity violations on a trial-by-trial 223 
basis (while accounting for other factors that may result in violations of transitivity) we constructed 224 
a set of hierarchical logistic regression models. We found that absolute difference in value (|DV|) 225 
was a robust negative predictor of TV (z=-6.59, p<0.0001; Figure 4 B) such that participants were 226 
more likely to violate transitivity when items were closer in value. Critically, this same model 227 
showed that even when |DV| was accounted for, confidence was a negative predictor of transitivity 228 
violations (z=-6.75, p<.0001). In other words, participants were less confident during those trials in 229 
which they went against their best-fitting preference order. Finally, both response time (z=2.55, 230 
p=.01) and summed value (z=2.55, p=.01) positively predicted transitivity violations, such that trials 231 
in which the value of both options was higher and/or in trials in which their responses were slower, 232 
participants’ choices were more likely to result in transitivity violations.  Similar to the change of 233 
mind analysis, eye tracking variables did not reliably predict transitivity violations (GSF=-1.74, 234 
p=.08; |DDT| z=-0.47, p=.64) (Figure 5B). Note that this was still true when reported confidence 235 
was excluded from the regression analysis (see supplementary materials, section S7b).  236 
 237 
Finally, we examined whether intersubject variability in metacognitive ability affected transitivity 238 
violations. We reasoned that if a well-calibrated, explicit representation of uncertainty plays a role 239 
in guiding future decisions, participants with greater metacognitive ability would show a decrease in 240 
the number of transitivity violations when the same option was presented a second time. In line 241 
with this hypothesis we observed that greater metacognitive ability was associated with a marked 242 
reduction in transitivity violations between the first and second presentation of the same choice 243 
(beta=0.85, SE=0.42, z(26)=2.03, p<.05; Figure 4 C). We also confirmed that this effect was not 244 
due to a relationship between metacognition and choice instability: the total number of transitivity 245 
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violations was unrelated to metacognitive accuracy (beta=-1.83, SE=1.61, z(26)=-1.14, p=0.25). 246 
Together these analyses show that a more accurate explicit representation of confidence is 247 
associated with more optimal choices when participants are given the opportunity to change their 248 
minds. 249 
 250 
Figure 4 251 
 252 
Discussion 253 
What is the advantage of explicitly representing one’s confidence in value-based decision-making? 254 
Most experimental setups elicit confidence after a decision has been made and cannot be 255 
changed. Our hypothesis was that an explicit representation of confidence might serve an 256 
important role in decision-making by signalling the need to explore different alternatives when the 257 
same (or a similar) choice is presented again.  258 
 259 
Value-based decisions are often perceptually unambiguous (i.e. a banana is noticeably different 260 
from an apple) and most of the uncertainty is contingent on a number of internal processes such as 261 
memories or homeostatic states that are often difficult to manipulate experimentally. For example, 262 
a choice between two food items might be affected both by uncertainty about the tastes of the 263 
items and by uncertainty about one’s own level of hunger. In order to take advantage of this 264 
information, a decision-maker should be able to correctly monitor uncertainty that arises from the 265 
different constitutive computations. A wealth of work has shown that humans can introspect on 266 
their choice process and report their level of confidence, an ability that has been associated with 267 
the psychological concept of metacognition. However, the functions of these explicit 268 
representations of confidence (as opposed to implicit markers of uncertainty such as decision time) 269 
have remained unclear. Furthermore, individuals show wide variations in how accurately they can 270 
track and report fluctuations in uncertainty (i.e. metacognitive accuracy). 271 
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 272 
In two independent experiments we showed that confidence reports (elicited after a value-based 273 
decision) reliably predicted a change of mind when the same choice was presented again. This 274 
effect is robust after controlling for other factors associated with the difficulty of a decision, such as 275 
difference in value and reaction time.  Furthermore, intersubject variability in metacognitive 276 
accuracy modulated the degree to which confidence predicted change of mind: confidence was a 277 
stronger predictor of change of mind in participants with better metacognitive abilities. Critically, 278 
and in contrast to our findings on explicit confidence reports, a lower-level marker of uncertainty 279 
(GSF) did not predict subsequent changes of mind, suggesting that an explicit representation of 280 
uncertainty expressed through confidence is important for guiding future choices. Instead, we 281 
suggest that gaze shift frequency can be considered an ingredient that agents use to construct a 282 
subjective sense of certainty, together with decision time and strength of evidence (cf. 3). An 283 
alternative interpretation of our results is that gaze shift frequency does not contribute directly to 284 
subjective confidence but reflects an agent’s attempt to gather more information to adaptively 285 
reduce uncertainty (a situation in which confidence would be low and reaction time slow). Future 286 
work is required to distinguish between these two hypotheses. A further methodological appeal of 287 
GSF as a trial-by-trial measure of uncertainty is that it can be easily gathered in animals. Recent 288 
years have seen a resurgence of interest in studying uncertainty and confidence using animal 289 
models39. This promising line of work relies heavily on the development of experimental paradigms 290 
(such as opt-out or post decision wagering) to measure the fluctuation in uncertainty during a 291 
decision process. GSF (which can be measured in rodents by tracking head movements) may 292 
prove a useful tool to monitor, on a trial-by-trial basis, internal fluctuations in uncertainty and its 293 
relation to the neural encoding of decision time and strength of evidence. 294 
 295 
Tracking the level of decision uncertainty is helpful in guiding behaviour in a number of contexts; 296 
for example, in guiding learning 40, in deciding whether to explore a new alternative or stick with the 297 
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current one41, 42, or in evaluating an alternative course of action18. At the neural level, the 298 
rostrolateral prefrontal (RLPFC) cortex and frontopolar cortex have been shown to play key roles in 299 
tracking trial-by-trial evolution of uncertainty43, 44, 45 and modulating uncertainty-driven behaviours18, 300 
41, 42, 46, 47, 48. At the same time, the RLPFC and frontal pole have also been shown (using a number 301 
of different methods) to play a key role in enabling metacognitive abilities1, 10, 11, 14, 32. It is therefore 302 
possible that these two processes are linked anatomically and computationally: individuals whose 303 
prefrontal cortex more closely tracks the trial-by-trial evolution of uncertainty might also have more 304 
accurate explicit representations of confidence.  In turn, superior metacognitive abilities might 305 
confer the advantage of knowing how uncertain one’s choice was and therefore guide future 306 
behavioural strategies, such as uncertainty-driven exploration42 or changes of mind. Since we did 307 
not collect neural measures in this study we cannot test this hypothesis directly, but our findings 308 
provide a foundation for future studies of the neurobiology of changes of mind.   309 
 310 
Another question we sought to address was: are changes of mind associated with more optimal 311 
decisions?  In value-based decisions, the difference between correct decisions is often murky 312 
since value is a subjective construct. However, when people make a series of value-based choices 313 
across a set of options, their pattern of decisions is characterized by a variable degree of internal 314 
consistency. In experiment 1 we used a recently developed algorithm to find an optimal ranking of 315 
items that produced the lowest number of transitivity violations for each individual. In this way we 316 
identified when participants’ decisions were inconsistent with their overall (idiosyncratic) pattern of 317 
decisions. Violations of transitivity are a paradigmatic example of irrationality in economic choice 318 
since they are easy to exploit. For example, when individual preferences are not transitive, it is 319 
possible to construct a choice set in which each decision appears fair on its own, but, when 320 
combined together, guarantees a loss (a phenomenon known as a Dutch book or arbitrage in 321 
finance)49. Here we showed that choices made with high confidence are overall more transitive and 322 
therefore more optimal according to the normative prescriptions of utility theory. Noticeably, this 323 
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effect is robust after controlling for the absolute difference in value and reaction time. This finding 324 
suggests that individuals can monitor and report that a given decision was noisier and therefore 325 
more likely to result in a decision inconsistent with their overall preference patterns, establishing 326 
confidence as a correlate of choice accuracy without relying on the BDM procedure to derive 327 
independent estimates of subjective utility. This result also resonates with the well-established 328 
finding in perceptual decision making that people are able to detect and signal errors as soon as 329 
they respond16, 50 and with the proposal that confidence can facilitate cognitive control51. Here, we 330 
suggest that a similar process might operate in value-based decisions, in which errors can be 331 
thought of as choices that are at odds with one’s overall preferences. Consistent with this proposal, 332 
we found that individuals who have a more accurate representation of confidence (greater 333 
metacognitive ability) were more likely to move towards a more internally consistent decision-334 
making pattern over time. Our work sheds light on the reasons for an explicit representation of 335 
confidence in human decision-making. It explores value-based choices (aka economic choices) by 336 
borrowing methods and concepts from perceptual decision-making52. Similar to perceptual 337 
decision-making, we found that the same ‘strength of evidence’ in value (i.e. |DV|) is accompanied 338 
by a variable level of uncertainty that is represented explicitly as confidence. We suggest these 339 
representations play a functional role not only in allowing confidence to be shared with others, but 340 
also in guiding our own future choices. Taken together our results show that an explicit and 341 
accurate representation of confidence can have a positive impact on the quality of future value-342 
based decisions. 343 
 344 
Methods  345 
 346 
Experimental Procedures 347 
Experiment 1: Participants were required to make binary choices between 16 common 348 
snack items. Participants were asked to choose between each combination of the items (N 349 
= 120) twice, counterbalanced across the left-right spatial configurations (total number of 350 
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choices = 240). After each choice, participants indicated their confidence in their decision 351 
on a continuous rating scale. Neither choices nor confidence ratings were time constrained. 352 
Trial order was randomized with the only constraint being that the same pair was never 353 
repeated in subsequent trials. Participants’ eye movements were recorded throughout this 354 
task. 355 
 356 
At the end of the experiment, one choice from this phase was played out and the subject 357 
had the opportunity to buy the chosen item by means of an auction administered according 358 
to the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure: The experimenter randomly extracted 359 
a price from a uniform distribution (£0 to £3)—the ‘market price’ of that item. If the 360 
participant’s bidding price (willingness-to-pay) was below the market price, no transaction 361 
occurred. The computer-generated value was drawn to a precision greater than 2 decimals 362 
to avoid the possibility of a tie but was rounded to pennies in the event of a transaction. If 363 
the subject’s bidding price was above the market price, the participant bought the snack 364 
item at the market price17. At the end of the experiment, participants had to remain in the 365 
lab for an additional hour. During this hour, the only food they were allowed to eat was the 366 
item purchased in the auction, if any. At the end of the waiting period participants were 367 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. Participants were paid £25 for their time, 368 
deducting the cost of the food item, if they bought any. Both tasks were programmed using 369 
MATLAB 8.0 (MathWorks) running the Psychophysics toolbox (http://psychtoolbox.org) as 370 
well as the Eyelink toolbox extensions53, 54. The procedure of this experiment was approved 371 
by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID: 3736/004). 372 
 373 
Experiment 2: Participants gave their willingness to pay for 72 common snack food items 374 
on a scale ranging from £0-£3, in a BDM procedure17 similar to the one in experiment 1. 375 
Next they completed a choice task where, in each trial, they had to pick their favourite item 376 
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out of three options. The triplets presented in the choice task were tailored for each 377 
participant from their willingness-to-pay ratings. The items were divided into high-value and 378 
low-value sets by a median split. The 36 high-value items were randomly combined into 12 379 
high-value triplets; this procedure was mirrored to generate 12 low-value triplets. The high-380 
value and low-value items were then mixed to generate medium value triplets, with 12 381 
triplets consisting of two high-value items and one low-value item, and 12 triplets with the 382 
reverse ratio. This resulted in 48 unique triplets, with counterbalanced spatial configurations 383 
(total trials =144), split into three blocks. Each triplet was shown once in each block, the 384 
presentation order inside blocks was randomized with the constraint that the triplet that 385 
ended one block was never shown first in the next block. 386 
 387 
In the subsequent choice task, the triplets were presented inside 3 squares in an 388 
equidistant 2x2 grid (one randomly-determined position on the grid was left empty). We 389 
used a gaze-contingent paradigm in which the items were only visible when the participant 390 
fixated inside one of the squares, so that the participant could only see one item at a time. 391 
They had unlimited time to make up their mind and could make as many fixations as they 392 
wished. After each choice, participants indicated their confidence in their decision on a 393 
visual analogue rating scale without any time constraints. Participants’ eye movements 394 
were recorded throughout the choice task. Both the choice task and the willingness to pay 395 
procedure were programmed in Experiment Builder version 1.10.1640, SR-Research, 396 
Ontario. 397 
 398 
Following the choice task, an auction based on the BDM-ratings took place (see experiment 399 
1). After the auction, participants had to remain in the lab for an additional hour as in 400 
experiment 1. At the end of the waiting period participants were debriefed and thanked for 401 
their participation. Participants were paid £15 for their time, deducting the cost of the food 402 
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item, if they bought any. The procedure of this experiment was approved by the University 403 
of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Application number: Pre2014.113). 404 
 405 
Exclusion Criteria 406 
Because the aim of the experiment was to explore the relationship between confidence 407 
and value, it was essential that we had enough measurement sensitivity in both the 408 
confidence scale and in the value scale (the BDM ratings), and that participants’ choices 409 
reflected their stated preferences. We therefore excluded participants if any of the 410 
following criteria were met: 411 
1. Participants used less than 25% of the BDM Scale. 412 
2. Participants gave exactly the same BDM rating for more than 25% of the items. 413 
3. Participants used less than 25% of the confidence scale. 414 
4. Participants gave exactly the same confidence rating for more than 25% of their choices. 415 
5. Participant choices did not correspond to their BDM ratings (When predicting choices from 416 
differences in value, the DV coefficient deviated more than 2 SD from the experimentwise 417 
mean). 418 
 419 
Participants  420 
Experiment 1: 30 participants took part in the study. One participant did not complete the 421 
task and one participant was excluded because the BDM estimates were poor predictors of 422 
his choice (failed criterion 5). Thus 28 participants were included in the analysis (13 423 
females, age: 19-73). All participants were required to fast for four hours prior to taking part 424 
in the experiment. Blood glucose levels were taken to test their adherence to this criterion 425 
(mean glucose level = 83.57mg/dl, sd = 10.90mg/dl; by comparison, the mean fasting blood 426 
glucose levels for adults is 86.4mg/dl55). All participants gave informed consent prior to 427 
participating in this experiment. 428 
 429 
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Experiment 2: 30 participants completed the study. Of these 30, three were excluded due 430 
to a limited range in their BDM ratings (failed criterion 2). An additional three participants 431 
were excluded for a limited range in their use of the confidence scale (failed criterion 4). 24 432 
participants were included in the main analyses (17 females, age: 21-38). All participants 433 
were required to fast for four hours prior to doing the experiment.  All participants gave 434 
informed consent prior to participating in this experiment. 435 
 436 
Sample size was determined a-priori. A power estimation was based on previously 437 
published work that used a similar experimental setup26. We implemented a fixed sample 438 
stopping rule set a-priori (N=30). Statistical inferences were conducted only after all data 439 
were collected. If a participant did not fulfil one of the exclusion criteria (decided before data 440 
collection) would have been excluded from the analysis without replacement. 441 
  442 
Eye Trackers 443 
For experiment 1, eye gaze was sampled at 250 Hz with a head-mounted SR Research 444 
Eyelink II eye-tracker (SR-Research, Ontario). For experiment 2, eye movements were 445 
recorded at 1000Hz with an EyeLink 1000 Plus eye-tracker (SR-Research, Ontario). 446 
 447 
Preparation of the Eye-tracking Data 448 
Experiment 1: Areas of Interest (AI) were defined by splitting the screen in half, creating 449 
two equal sized areas. Fixations in the left AI were assumed to be directed towards the left 450 
snack item, and vice versa. We constructed two variables from the eye tracking data: the 451 
difference in dwell time between the two AIs (DDT), and gaze shift frequency (GSF). DDT 452 
was calculated by subtracting the total dwell time on the left side from the total dwell time 453 
on the right side.  GSF was calculated as the number of times participants shifted their 454 
gaze from one AI to the other during each trial. 455 
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Experiment 2: AIs were pre-defined by the 3 squares that participants had to fixate to view 456 
the items (given the gaze-contingent design). We derived two variables from the eye 457 
tracking data: the total dwell time in each AI for a given trial, and GSF.  Following 458 
experiment 1, GSF measured the number of fixations in one AI immediately followed by a 459 
fixation in another AI. To ensure that participants paid attention, we excluded trials where 460 
participants had not fixated on every option available at least once. 13 trials out of 3457 461 
were excluded from the analysis for this reason. 462 
 463 
Hierarchical Models 464 
All hierarchical analyses reported in the results section were conducted using the lme4 465 
package (version 1.1-756) in R.  For the linear models degrees of freedom and p-values 466 
were obtained using the Kenward-Roger approximation, as implemented in the pbkrtest 467 
package57. For the choice models (Figures 1 C and F) we ran two hierarchical logistic 468 
regressions: In Experiment 1 we predicted the log odds ratio of picking the right-hand 469 
option on a given trial; for Experiment 2 we predicted the log odds ratio of picking the 470 
reference item. The reference item was determined as the first item encountered according 471 
to reading order in Latin languages (i.e. the upper left item for the trials when an item was 472 
presented in that position and the upper right item for the remaining trials). Fixed effect 473 
confidence intervals were estimated by multiplying the standard errors by 1.9658. Because 474 
these confidence intervals are estimates that do not take the covariance between 475 
parameters into account59 they should not be interpreted too strictly, but rather serve to give 476 
the reader a sense of the precision of the fixed effect coefficients. Note that all predictors 477 
reported are z-scored on the participant level, and that all models allow for random slopes 478 
at the participant level. For completeness we report coefficients from the full model, while 479 
noting that this model is not in every case the most parsimonious. For a comprehensive list 480 
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of models tested and a formal model comparison using BIC scores see supplementary 481 
materials, section S3. 482 
 483 
Note that the regression models for confidence in experiment 1 had issues converging. We 484 
addressed these issues by square root transforming the |DV| predictor. Notably, for the 485 
individual difference analyses investigating change of mind and transitivity we did not 486 
implement hierarchical models, but unpooled (individual-level) models. The rationale behind 487 
this choice was that for both analyses we were interested in studying between-subjects 488 
variation (Figure 3 C and Figure 4 C) that could be potentially affected by the shrinkage of 489 
parameters towards the group mean that is characteristic of hierarchical models60. 490 
Data availability & Code availability 491 
The data and the code for the analyses presented in this article can be found at the BDM 492 
Lab GitHub page: https://github.com/BDMLab 493 
The data can also be found on figshare: https://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.3756144.v2 494 
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 687 
Figure 1:  Relation between confidence and choice 688 
Eye-tracking tasks: (a) In Experiment 1, participants were presented with two snack items and 689 
were then required to choose one item to consume at the end of the experiment. (d) In Experiment 690 
2, participants chose between three options, and the presentation of the stimuli was contingent on 691 
which box participants looked at. In both experiments, participants indicated their confidence that 692 
they had made a correct decision on a visual analogue scale after each choice they made. (b) 693 
Probability of choosing the item on the right as a function of the difference in value between the 694 
options, data from. (e) Probability of choosing the reference item (see methods), as a function of 695 
the value difference between the reference item and the mean value of the alternatives. Black line, 696 
high confidence trials, grey line, low confidence trials (as determined by a median split).  Each 697 
graph shows the z-scored data pooled across participants. Points represent quartiles of DV. Error 698 
bars show standard errors. (c and f) Fixed effects coefficients from hierarchical logistic regression 699 
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models predicting choice (DV= difference in value; SV= summed value; DDT = difference in dwell 700 
time, DV x Confidence= Interaction of difference in value and confidence; DV x SV= Interaction of 701 
difference in value and summed value). The graph for experiment 1 (C) shows the coefficients 702 
predicting the probability of choosing the right-hand option; the graph for experiment 2 (F) shows 703 
the coefficients predicting the probability of choosing the reference option (see Methods). Error 704 
bars show 95% CIs. The sample size for experiment 1 was 28 participant (each completing 240 705 
trials), the sample size for experiment 2 was 24 participants (each completing 144 trials) *** = p < 706 
.001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 (two-sided).   707 
 708 
 709 
 710 
Figure 2. Factors that contribute to confidence 711 
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(a-b) Fixed-effect coefficients in hierarchical regression models predicting confidence for 712 
experiment 1 and 2, respectively. Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 713 
(two-sided). (|DV|= absolute difference in value; RT = reaction time; SV= summed value; GSF = 714 
Gaze Shift Frequency). (c–d) 4-D heat maps showing mean z-scored confidence as a function of 715 
subject specific quantiles of response time, absolute difference in value and gaze shift frequency. 716 
The sample size for experiment 1 was 28 participants (each completing 240 trials); the sample size 717 
for experiment 2 was 24 participants (each completing 144 trials) 718 
 719 
 720 
 721 
 722 
 723 
Figure 3. Confidence predicts change of mind. 724 
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(a-b) Fixed effects coefficients from hierarchical logistic regression models predicting future 725 
changes of mind. Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 (two-sided). 726 
(|DV|= absolute difference in value; RT = reaction time; SV= summed value; GSF = gaze shift 727 
frequency; |DDT|= absolute difference in dwell time) (c) Correlation between metacognitive 728 
accuracy and the coefficients for confidence ratings predicting future changes of mind (highlighted 729 
in pale green). Participants with greater metacognitive accuracy are more likely to change their 730 
mind following a low-confidence judgment; note that the correlation is negative because the 731 
relationship between confidence and changes of mind is itself negative (lower confidence 732 
increases the probability of subsequent changes of mind). Participants from experiment 1 are 733 
represented by black dots; participants from experiment 2 are represented by grey diamonds. Both 734 
axes (x and y) are z-scored for each experiment separately. The sample size for experiment 1 was 735 
28 participants (each completing 240 trials); the sample size for experiment 2 was 24 participants 736 
(each completing 144 trials) 737 
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 738 
Figure 4. Link between confidence and transitivity  739 
(a) Heat maps showing the number transitivity violations for the full sample and for high and low 740 
confidence trials (median split). The middle diagonal line is empty because no item was ever 741 
paired with itself. Note most transitivity violations took place on low-confidence trials. (b) Fixed 742 
effects coefficients from a hierarchical logistic regression model predicting transitivity violations 743 
Error bars show 95% CIs. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05 (two-sided).  (|DV|= absolute 744 
difference in value; RT = reaction time; SV= summed value; GSF = gaze shift frequency; |DDT|= 745 
absolute difference in dwell time). (c) Decreases in transitivity violations between the first and 746 
second presentation for each participant, as a function of metacognitive accuracy. The graph 747 
shows that participants who are more metacognitively accurate tend to become more transitive 748 
over time. The sample size for experiment 1 was 28 participants (each completing 240 trials). 749 
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